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Postdisaster Futures: Hopeful 
Pessimism, Imperial Ruination,  
and La futura cuir
Yarimar Bonilla
The Oxford English Dictionary defines disaster as both “an event or fact that has unfortunate 
consequences” and “a person or thing that is a complete failure.”1 Perhaps this double meaning 
explains why in the wake of two back-to-back hurricanes, Puerto Rican residents responded 
with graffiti stating, “El desastre es la colonia” (“The disaster is the colony”; see fig. 1). This 
slogan suggests that the most deeply felt catastrophe in contemporary Puerto Rico is not 
the arrival of hurricanes, earthquakes, or even the looming threats of climate change but the 
slowly accruing effects of raciocolonial governance.
Since Hurricane Maria in September 2017, I have been trying to think and write about how 
Puerto Rico’s recent disasters have ripped the veil off this US territory’s colonial status—both 
for those observing from afar, who have perhaps never stopped to contemplate what Puerto 
Rico’s relationship to the United States entails, and for local residents, who were forced into an 
affective reckoning with the kinds of structural violence they have been enduring for decades.
The fact is, in contemporary Puerto Rico much of what looks like the product of a devas-
tating hurricane is actually the result of a failed postcolonial experiment. Long before Maria, 
the Puerto Rican landscape was already dominated by signs of ruin: bankruptcy, default, 
foreclosure, displacement, dispossession, exile, decay, and neglect. This is why at present 
you will find more signs, slogans, and hashtags denouncing colonialism and the debt than 
1 Lexico, US Dictionary, s.v. “disaster,” www.lexico.com/en/definition/disaster (accessed 26 March 2020).
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Figure 1. Graffiti reading, “El desastre es la colonia” (“The disaster is the colony”), on a light meter six months after 
Hurricane Maria, 9 March 2018. Photograph by Lorie Shaull. Published with Creative Commons License CC BY-SA 2.0, 
www.flickr.com/photos/number7cloud/25836790197/in/album-72157687505819412/. 
the inefficiencies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also why you will find 
signs placed on crumbling infrastructure clarifying that the damage was not caused by Maria 
(see fig. 2).
Disasters are commonly said to unmask social structures.2 In that sense both Hurricane 
Maria and the larger economic and political crisis that surrounds it have created moments 
of reckoning with the larger failures of Puerto Rico’s postcolonial project.3 Like most of the 
nonindependent Caribbean, Puerto Rico has often been imagined—including by its own resi-
dents—as a political exception for not following the path of independence. In other writings I 
2 See Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna M. Hoffman, Catastrophe and Culture: An Anthropology of Disaster (Santa Fe, NM: 
School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series, 2002), 3–22, esp. 9.
3 As Joaquín Villanueva writes in his review of recent books in the “post-Maria” genre, there is an emerging “post-traumatic 
intellectual impulse” coursing through Puerto Rican studies at present that is leading many of us to explore “the dark 
truths” that Hurricane Maria has revealed. This in turn is part of the larger “insurgent intellectual networks” that, as Mimi 
Sheller observes, have become active in the wake of the current climate crisis in the Caribbean. Joaquín Villanueva, “On 
Yarimar Bonilla and Marisol LeBrón’s Aftershocks of Disaster: Puerto Rico Before and After the Storm and Ed Morales’ 
Fantasy Island: Colonialism, Exploitation, and the Betrayal of Puerto Rico,” Antipode (January 2020), antipodeonline.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Book-review_Villanueva-on-Bonilla-and-LeBr%C3%B3n-and-Morales.pdf, 1; Mimi Sheller, 
“Caribbean Reconstruction and Climate Justice: Transnational Insurgent Intellectual Networks and Post-hurricane Transfor-
mation,” Journal of Extreme Events 5, no. 4 (2018), doi.org/10.1142/S2345737618400018. Villanueva quotes “dark truths” 
from Arcadio Díaz-Quiñones, forward to Yarimar Bonilla and Marisol LeBrón, eds., Aftershocks of Disaster: Puerto Rico 
Before and After the Storm (Chicago: Haymarket, 2019), xii.
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Figure 2. Sign reading, “#MaríaNoFue” (“#ThisWasNotMaría”), on debris in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, 29 April 2019. 
Photograph by Patricia Noboa.
have questioned the discourse of exceptionality that tends to surround the nonindependent 
Caribbean by stressing that most Caribbean societies are not nation-states but rather protec-
torates, departments, special municipalities, and other political forms that bring into question 
the norm of the independent nation-state.4 Moreover, even the nominally independent nations 
of the Caribbean suffer from forms of constrained or limited nonsovereignty.5 Sovereignty in 
the Caribbean is thus best understood as a contested claim and an imposed ideal rather than 
an actually existing condition.6
In this essay I extend this argument further by discussing how Puerto Rico is currently 
undergoing an affective crisis that echoes the political disenchantment discernible within and 
outside the region. Throughout the Caribbean and beyond, the twentieth-century project of 
postwar decolonization has resulted in debt economies, displaced diasporas, deep social 
cleavages, and shattered hopes for the future. I am interested in thinking about the kinds of 
political life that can emerge in the wake of this postcolonial disaster. And, again, by disaster 
4 See Yarimar Bonilla, “Ordinary Sovereignty,” Small Axe, no. 42 (November 2013): 152–65; and Yarimar Bonilla and 
Max Hantel, “Visualizing Sovereignty: Cartographic Queries for the Digital Age,” archipelagos, no. 1 (June 2016), 
archipelagosjournal.org/issue01/bonilla-visualizing.html.
5 See Yarimar Bonilla, Non-Sovereign Futures: French Caribbean Politics in the Wake of Disenchantment (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2015); and “Freedom, Sovereignty, and Other Entanglements,” Small Axe, no. 53 (July 2017): 201–8.
6 See Yarimar Bonilla, “Unsettling Sovereignty,” Cultural Anthropology 32, no. 3 (2017): 330–39.
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I mean not just “an event of unfortunate consequences” but also a failure—specifically, the 
failure of the modernist project of decolonization.
Thus I want to examine how contemporary Puerto Ricans are navigating not only the mate-
rial ruins of a hurricane-ravaged society but also what Ann Stoler terms the “imperial debris” of 
a failed colonial and postcolonial experiment. As Stoler suggests, imperial ruins include both 
physical structures (abandoned sugar mills, closed schools, collapsed buildings, and failed 
development projects) as well as dispositions, which she describes as the microecologies of 
both matter and mind. She employs the notion of ruin as “a violent verb that unites apparently 
disparate moments, places, and objects.” It is in that sense that the current landscape of ruin 
in Puerto Rico unites the remnants of hurricanes, earthquakes, failed development schemes, 
debt economies, displacement, dispossession, and a broader disenchantment with a previous 
era of postcolonial promises. Following Stoler, I am interested in the “ ‘tangible’ effects” of 
living among ruins, how ruination produces a series of political dispositions and imaginaries, 
and how populations build new futures out of the debris of futures past.7
In other words, I am concerned with how Puerto Ricans navigate the problem-space of 
postcolonial disaster: a political context of material and affective ruin that is no longer guided 
by the promise of a better postcolonial future or the palliative anticipation of a sovereignty to 
come. As David Scott has written, a certain feeling of “afterness” prevails in the contemporary 
Caribbean; there is a feeling of “living on in the wake of past political time, amid the ruins, 
specifically, of postsocialist and postcolonial futures past.”8
This becomes all the more acute as the winds of climate change combine political ruins 
with environmental ones leading to rising sea levels, eroded coasts, increased hurricane winds, 
and collapsed infrastructure. What visions of the future can emerge from this context of cata-
strophic sedimentation? What can postdisaster politics look like when no longer guided by 
the promise of modernist development, faith in the promises of a native state, or the anticipa-
tion of postcolonial sovereignty? Who will be the political subject of the postdisaster future?
The Promise of Decolonization
Let me take a step back and first make a case for thinking about Puerto Rico as the site of 
a failed postcolonial experiment. Since its acquisition by the United States in 1898, Puerto 
Rico has served as a site of experimentation, broadly speaking. Everything from birth control 
and sterilization procedures to deadly pesticides and military weaponry have been tested and 
7 Ann Laura Stoler, “ ‘The Rot Remains’: From Ruins to Ruination,” in Ann Laura Stoler, ed., Imperial Debris: On Ruins and 
Ruination (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 7, 5, 7.
8 David Scott, Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 6, 2.
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refined on Puerto Rican soil.9 Experiments have been conducted on its land and its people 
but also on its forms of governance.10
From the moment of its nonincorporation into the federation of states as a territory 
that “belongs to” but is not “a part of” the United States, Puerto Rico has served as a site 
from which to test the limits of stratified inclusion, structural violence, racial governance, 
and constrained decolonization. US founding fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson, declared 
that the United States, having only recently thrown off its own colonial yoke, should not 
acquire colonies in the traditional sense. Territorial expansion within the continent was thus 
carried out with the aim of democratic incorporation into the nascent federation of states. 
However, this meant that there was great concern about the racial composition of the newly 
acquired territories. Texas, California, New Mexico, and Oklahoma were not admitted as 
states until they had been sufficiently transformed by white settlers. Meanwhile, Puerto 
Rico, Hawaii, Alaska, and the Philippines caused concern because it was unclear whether 
these sites could ever be sufficiently settled and racially transformed. In order to solve 
this quagmire, a new legal category was invented: that of the “unincorporated territories.” 
This would distinguish settlements like Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma—which 
were incorporated but not yet admitted as states because they were still in the process of 
settlement—from sites that were unincorporated and thus not destined for annexation. The 
latter were said to belong to but not be a part of the United States. They were described 
as foreign, “in a domestic sense,” and placed in a legal category of their own—unfit for 
either citizenship or sovereignty.11
In 1952 the island’s current political status, locally referred to as the ELA (an acronym for 
Estado Libre Asociado), was developed as a way of meeting the rising calls for self-determi-
nation around the globe. This status was glossed in English as commonwealth: an empty term 
that simultaneously evoked formulas of statehood, independence, and dominion. Estado Libre 
Asociado similarly evoked a multiplicity of forms by suggesting that Puerto Rico would now 
be free, associated, and a state, when in fact it was none of these. The slippery semantics of 
the ELA were a purposeful attempt at appeasing the various claims from local residents for 
independence, which was supported by a large constituency at the time, while also appealing 
to those who favored statehood, a formula that had growing local support even as Congress 
remained firmly opposed to its prospect.
9 See Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and US Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002); Alexa S. Dietrich, The Drug Company Next Door: Pollution, Jobs, and Community Health in Puerto 
Rico (New York: New York University Press, 2013); and Katherine T. McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protests: The 
US Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002).
 10 Juan R. Torruella, “Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation with Its Future: A Reply to the Notion of ‘Ter-
ritorial Federalism,’ ” Harvard Law Review Forum 131, no. 3 (2018): 65.
 11 See Christina Duffy Burnett et al., eds., Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitu-
tion (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); and Juan R. Torruella, “The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime 
of Political Apartheid,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 29, no. 2 (2007): 283–347.
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At the moment of its founding, the ELA was described as an agreement “in the nature of 
a compact”—a legal euphemism that masked the fact that it was not an agreement between 
two equal parties or even a binding piece of legislation.12 The language of Public Law 600 was 
so vague that political scientist Peter Fliess wrote at the time, “Even if it were binding, one 
still would not know what was binding.” Fliess continued: “In this relationship the respective 
powers of the United States and Puerto Rico are complemented, harmonized, and combined, 
which seems a peculiar euphemism for a relationship of supra- and subordination.”13
The main proponent of the commonwealth, Puerto Rico’s first freely elected governor 
Luis Muñoz Marín, assured Puerto Ricans that this new status would put a definitive end to 
“every trace of colonialism,” granting freedom, dignity, equality, and a permanent union with 
the United States. Nevertheless, within Washington the bill’s sponsors assured Congress that 
the law would leave the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States intact and 
Muñoz Marín himself testified in a Senate committee hearing that “if the people of Puerto Rico 
should go crazy, Congress [could   ] always . . . legislate again.”14
The main outcome of the slippery and ambiguous ELA was thus a symbolic one, though it 
did allow the United States to successfully petition the United Nations to remove Puerto Rico 
from the list of non-self-governing societies—thus freeing the United States from submitting 
routine reports on its political conditions. The symbolism of the date chosen for the ELA’s 
signing, 25 July—the same day as the US Navy’s landing on Puerto Rico’s southern coast 
in 1898—further served to cloak Puerto Rico’s colonial status, while inadvertently creating a 
palimpsest.
Although often viewed as a unique relationship, the formation of the ELA was part of a 
larger process of political experimentation following the end of the Second World War.15 Around 
the same time as the establishment of the ELA, both the Dutch and the French Antilles were 
engaging in similar forms of nonsovereign incorporation to their metropoles, while in the Brit-
ish Caribbean the West Indies Federation and later the commonwealth of nations were taking 
shape.16 Meanwhile, in what would become independent nations, forms of decolonization 
were being forged that allowed for “flag independence” while severely limiting economic and 
other forms of sovereignty.17
12 Public Law 600, Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, 30 July 1950, www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/81st
-congress/session-2/c81s2ch446.pdf, 1.
13 Peter J. Fliess, “Puerto Rico’s Political Status under Its New Constitution,” Western Political Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1952): 642 
(italics in original), 651.
14 Luis Muñoz Marín, quoted in Torruella, “Why Puerto Rico,” 81, 79 (italics in original).
15 See, for example, Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 
1945–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
16 See Bonilla and Hantel, “Visualizing Sovereignty”; Angel Israel Rivera Ortiz and Aarón Gamaliel Ramos, Islands at the 
Crossroads: Politics in the Non-independent Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); and Lammert de Jong and Dirk 
Kruijt, eds., Extended Statehood in the Caribbean: Paradoxes of Quasi Colonialism, Local Autonomy, and Extended State-
hood in the USA, French, Dutch, and British Caribbean (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2005).
17 Linden Lewis, ed., Caribbean Sovereignty, Development, and Democracy in an Age of Globalization (Abingdon, UK: Rout-
ledge, 2013).
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During the mid-twentieth century residents of both the independent nations and the many 
commonwealths, departments, and other postcolonial experiments in the Caribbean were 
offered the promise of a bright postcolonial future by local political elites and former imperial 
powers. Throughout the region modernism, development, and economic growth appeared to 
beckon on the postcolonial horizon.18 In the first decades following the formation of the ELA, 
Puerto Rico did experience rapid industrialization and economic progress, owing in great part 
to the postwar New Deal policies and tax incentives that lured American manufacturing to 
the island. These results were celebrated as exemplars of US-led capitalist development, and 
Puerto Rico was showcased as an alternative to left-wing politics in other parts of the region. 
A 1970s promotional film for Puerto Rico went so far as to describe the territory as “Progress 
Island,” representing it as a site of rapid development and unstoppable growth.19 However, the 
main beneficiaries of these policies were not Puerto Rican residents but American companies 
that reaped profits, tax breaks, and a captive market for their products.20
As in other parts of the Caribbean, the promises of decolonization in Puerto Rico soon 
began to fade. In the early 1970s—as the global economy experienced significant shocks 
because of rising oil prices—it was already becoming clear that development via foreign invest-
ment was not leading to sustainable growth. By the 1990s, when the Bill Clinton administra-
tion removed the tax incentives that had once lured manufacturing industries to the island, 
Puerto Rico’s economy began a historic downturn. As a result, local administrations turned 
to heavy borrowing—with direct assistance from Wall Street—to compensate and mask a 
deflated economic base.21
By 2015 Puerto Rico’s governor declared that the territory was at risk of descending into 
what economists describe as a “financial death spiral.”22 For many, this was just a confirmation 
of the looming sense of doom that had already presided over the society for decades. Following 
the governor’s declaration that Puerto Rico’s debt was “unpayable,” the federal government 
denied the island the right to declare bankruptcy. Instead, the government passed what is 
known as the PROMESA law (Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability 
Act), which allowed for the imposition of an undemocratically appointed fiscal control board 
to manage the island’s finances in what for many represented a return to a previous era of 
overt colonial rule.23
18 See Harvey Neptune, “ ‘The Twilight Years’: Caribbean Social Movements, 1940–1960,” Africana Age essays, New York 
Public Library, exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-caribbean-40.html.
19 See “1970s Puerto Rico USA Promotional Film Progress Island USA, San Juan 83994,” YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=jdTQGNZMYPI.
20 See Harry Grubet and Joel Slemrod, “The Effect of Taxes on Investments and Income Shifting to Puerto Rico,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 80, no. 3 (1998): 365–73.
21 See Bonilla and LeBrón, editors’ introduction to Aftershocks of Disaster, 1–17.
22 Mary Williams Walsh, “Puerto Rico’s Governor Warns of Fiscal ‘Death Spiral,’ ” New York Times, 14 October 2016.
23 See Pedro Cabán, “PROMESA, Puerto Rico, and the American Empire,” Latino Studies 16, no. 2 (2018): 161–84.
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The Death of the Promises
The contemporary debt crisis made clear what many had long known: the commonwealth 
status created in 1952 had been a mere facade for an enduring colonial condition. In 2016 
the approval of the PROMESA law, along with the deliberations and results of two landmark 
Supreme Court cases in which the nature of Puerto Rico’s sovereignty was discussed, effec-
tively removed the cloak from Puerto Rico’s status.24 For the first time, the assertion that Puerto 
Rico was a colony was no longer a claim issued exclusively by advocates of independence; 
it was an accepted reality. For example, in May 2016 a special television segment aired on 
Univision with the title “In the Face of the Death of the ELA, What Alternatives Does Puerto 
Rico Have?” The segment featured interviews with political experts matter-of-factly exploring 
possibilities for a post-ELA Puerto Rico.25
During this period many began to talk openly about “la muerte del ELA” (the death of the 
commonwealth). This was accompanied by staged funeral processions, the display of Puerto 
Rican flags recast in black and white, a satirical obituary for the ELA in the local newspaper, 
and performative mortuary rites. At one event in front of the capitol building, hundreds gath-
ered for a performative funeral and a “Dinner en Noir”—a satirical take on the haute culture 
of the elegant Dîner en Blanc global event in which some Puerto Rican elites had recently 
participated.26 Organizers described the event as a funeral for lo inexistente (that which never 
existed). During the activities, performance artist Mickey Negrón addressed attendees by 
saying, “This will not be an abundant meal. This will be a precarious dinner because the ELA, 
which doesn’t exist and in any case never existed—strange things happen in the colony—left 
us this way: in precarity.”27
Indeed, the “political death” of the ELA was followed by the severe economic measures 
imposed by both the fiscal board and the local government in what has increasingly come to 
be understood as a political experiment in new forms of austerity governance.28 Puerto Rico 
thus effectively shifted from being a laboratory of modernist development to an experimental 
site of neoliberal management.
This austerity regime has led to an even greater landscape of ruin: shuttered elementary 
schools, a gutted public university, a defunded health system, crumbling infrastructure, and 
24 For more on the Supreme Court cases, see Mark Joseph Stern, “The Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Puerto Rican 
Sovereignty,” Slate, 9 June 2016; Vann R. Newkirk II, “Puerto Rico’s Dream, Denied,” Atlantic, 14 June 2016; and Monica 
A. Jimenez, “ ‘Esta “democracia” no la entendemos’: On Exercising Democracy in the World’s Oldest Colony,” Society and 
Space, 25 February 2020.
25 “Ante la muerte del ELA, ¿Qué alternativas tiene Puerto Rico?,” Univision, 5 May 2016. All translations are mine.
26 See Juan R. Costa, “Celebran la muerte del ELA frente al Capitolio (galeria y video),” Noticel, 30 June 2016.
27 “Esta no será una cena abundante. Será una cena precaria. Porque el ELA, que no existe y como quiera existió—cosas 
extrañas pasan en la colonia—nos dejó así, en la precariedad”; Emmanuel Estrada López, “ELA, o la muerte de lo inexis-
tente,” Diálogo UPR, 3 July 2016.
28 See Andrew Rice, “The McKinsey Way to Save an Island,” New York Magazine, 17 April 2019.
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/small-axe/article-pdf/24/2 (62)/147/815222/0240147.pdf
by UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, rjobson1990@gmail.com
on 05 August 2020
SX62 [ 7.2020 ] 155
a migratory crisis that has generated the increasing feeling of an emptying island, with more 
Puerto Ricans currently residing in the fifty states than in Puerto Rico.29
In response to the emerging landscape of desolation and abandonment, a slick market-
ing campaign was developed that implored residents to keep their chins up and to not quit 
(#YoNoMeQuito).30 The campaign sought to promote “toughing it out,” not quitting and instead 
enduring—facing head-on the mechanisms of slow violence that austerity implies. Many inter-
preted this slogan as a jab at those who had migrated, but the fact is that those who had left 
have also had much to endure as they confront the naked racism of the United States under 
the Donald Trump regime, in which they are suddenly questioned on their citizenship, asked 
to show their passports, berated for displaying a Puerto Rican flag or for speaking Spanish in 
public—all while navigating the new affective terrain of exile.
And then, Hurricane Maria hit. Amid what was already a landscape of ruin, this category-
five storm led to the deadliest disaster in modern US history, producing more casualties than 
9/11. These deaths, however, were not caused by hurricane winds and rain but by the crisis 
of infrastructure that followed: a neglected power grid meant nearly a year without electricity 
for many residents, a gutted public works budget resulted in collapsed bridges and unrepaired 
roads and streetlights, and a dismantled public health system led to bacterial outbreaks and a 
collapsed hospital system. These infrastructural “aftershocks” were the result not of a sudden 
hurricane but of a failed political and economic system.31
With the declaration of the debt crisis, the limits of Puerto Rico’s colonial condition had 
already become undeniable; the inadequate response to the hurricane only exasperated this 
feeling. Puerto Ricans already had to contend with a future that heralded greater austerity 
and social decay. The university was under threat of losing its accreditation as the result of 
drastic budget cuts, the governor threatened to reduce funding for the hospital system, the 
Department of Education began shutting down schools and pushing toward a charter system 
modeled on post-Katrina New Orleans, and now hurricane recovery plans were feared to be 
leading to even greater displacement as communities faced the threat of being forcibly relo-
cated from newly declared zones of environmental vulnerability. Following Maria 98 percent 
of the territory has been declared an “opportunity zone” for foreign investment.32 Privatization, 
profiteering, and dispossession dominate the horizon.
29 See D’vera Cohn, Eileen Patten, and Mark Hugo Lopez, Puerto Rican Population Declines on Island, Grows on US Main-
land (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends, 2014).
30 For more on the debates surrounding this campaign, see “#YoNoMeQuito: To Stay or to Go?,” Puerto Rico Syllabus, www 
.puertoricosyllabus.com/huyendo-fleeing-crisis/yonomequito-to-stay-or-to-go/ (accessed 1 March 2020).
31 See Bonilla and LeBrón, Aftershocks of Disaster.
32 See “Puerto Rico Publishes List of Qualified Commercial Activities for Opportunity Zones,” Caribbean Business, 21 August 
2019; and Antonio R. Gómez, “Aseguran hay mayor interés de inversionistas en ‘zonas de oportunidad’ de Puerto Rico,” El 
Nuevo Día, 7 November 2019.
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Hopeful Pessimism
Political life in Puerto Rico must therefore now contend with a contemporary landscape marked 
by the ruins of a previous colonial experiment and a future horizon that heralds further decay. 
Part of what I am interested in thinking about is how this requires a new political orientation 
that breaks with modernist assumptions of a better future.
Italian philosopher Franco Berardi refers to this process as the “slow cancellation of the 
future,” which he describes as the increasing lack of faith in the modernist mythology of linear 
development and increasing prosperity.33 He argues that the modernist dream of unending 
development has shattered in the face of economic recession and precarity. Mark Fisher 
describes this as a feeling of “belatedness,” of having arrived “after the gold rush.”34
However, in the case of Puerto Rico, and the Caribbean more generally, the current 
prevailing affect is not one of a future superseded but, more precisely, of a future foreclosed. 
As one current political slogan in Puerto Rico suggests, “Se acabaron las promesas” (“The 
promises are over”), which is to say that what Puerto Ricans face is the end not of economic 
prosperity but rather of its promise. That is, Puerto Ricans must contend with the idea of losing 
something they never really obtained. As the performers at the ELA funeral proclaimed, they 
must mark the death of that which never existed. They find themselves mourning a fiction.
I am interested in how this current moment requires a political stance that is centered not 
on what Lauren Berlant describes as a “cruel optimism” that lulls one into a continued faith in 
liberal democratic promises of what is to come but rather on a particular form of pessimism: 
a belief that things are awful and not necessarily going to be repaired.35 For Berlant the rise 
of neoliberalism has led to the fraying of a particular set of fantasies: upward mobility, job 
security, and an open horizon of endless possibilities. These fantasies were never shared by 
the entire society—only a limited few within the global North ever experienced the fantasy of 
the postwar economic boom. However, with the consolidation of neoliberal policies, these 
assurances have become even more fantastical.
In the context of Puerto Rico, as with other postcolonial societies, modernist disappoint-
ments mingle with fraying postcolonial assurances of a superseded colonial relationship. In 
the era of climate change, these forms of disenchantment combine with a reduced faith in 
the supremacy of technological mastery over the environment. This is nowhere more evident 
than in the context of postearthquake Puerto Rico, where the concrete homes that were once 
the symbol of economic development, postcolonial prosperity, and technical mastery over the 
tropical environment now lay in ruins.36
33 Franco Bifo Berardi, After the Future (California: AK, 2011), 18.
34 Mark Fisher, Ghost of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology, and Lost Futures (Alresford, UK: John Hunt, 2014), 8.
35 See Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).
36 Beginning in late December 2019 Puerto Rico has been experiencing a sequence of quakes and seismic events, many  
of which have been magnitude five or greater; the largest and most damaging to date was a 6.4-magnitude quake on  
7 January. On Puerto Rico’s concrete homes, see Geoff Burrows, Concrete and Countryside: The Urban and the Rural in 
1950s Puerto Rican Culture (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018).
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While Berlant is concerned with what happens when individuals refuse to let go of their 
attachments to “good life fantasies,” I am more concerned with what happens when those 
fantasies are lost.37 How can we live and act politically in the absence of faith in a better future? 
How can we develop not a cruel optimism that blinds us to what is to come but rather a kind 
of hopeful pessimism that can serve to build politically in the face of ruin and the promise of 
further decay?
The Puerto Rican historian and activist Rafael Bernabe has argued that hope can actually 
be nurtured by pessimism. Following Terry Eagleton, Bernabe calls for “hope without optimism,” 
that is, a faith in political action, even in the midst of great uncertainty regarding where that 
action might ultimately lead.38 As Puerto Rican philosopher Rocío Zambrana argues, to organize 
pessimism is “to bet on what is possible from the actual.”39 For Zambrana pessimism does 
away with fantasies of the good life and naive expectations of a better future. Unlike a cruel 
optimism that blind us to the threats of the present, a hopeful pessimism opens our eyes to 
the hard tasks required to transform the here and now.
I believe this kind of hopeful pessimism might be what is needed to move beyond what 
David Scott has described as our “arrested” postcolonial present or what I have previously 
described as the “wake of disenchantment,” an era in which the political models of the past 
have lost their purchase but new political forms, vocabularies, and imaginaries are yet to 
emerge.40 In other words, perhaps a hopeful pessimism is what is needed to move beyond 
nostalgic immobility.
Postdisaster Futures
I would like to end by gesturing to how forms of hopeful pessimism are discernable among 
contemporary activists in Puerto Rico who are seeking to reimagine what politics might look 
like outside the modernist telos of nationalist progress and postcolonial sovereignty. I am 
particularly concerned with the political forms and communities that have emerged in the 
wake of the debt crisis and the protests that led to the governor’s resignation in the summer 
of 2019, particularly those protagonized by queer subjects.
The 2019 summer protests (at times described as “the Puerto Rican Summer,” in a 
nod to the Arab Spring) were catalyzed by the release of an 889-page group chat between 
then governor Ricardo Rosselló and eleven members of his administration, in which sexist, 
homophobic, and racist comments were combined with what appeared to be evidence of 
corruption, mismanagement, and a callousness (if not outright mockery) toward the suffering 
37 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 2.
38 “La esperanza sin optimism”; Rafael Bernabe, “Manifiesto de la esperanza sin optimismo en Puerto Rico,” 80 Grados, 24 
November 2017, www.80grados.net/manifiesto-de-la-esperanza-sin-optimismo-en-puerto-rico/.
39 Rocío Zambrana, Colonial Debts: The Case of Puerto Rico (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
40 Scott, Omens of Adversity, 6; Bonilla, Non-Sovereign Futures.
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and loss of life that resulted after Hurricane Maria.41 Mass demonstrations quickly arose and 
crystalized around the slogan #RickyRenuncia, which was used to call for the governor’s 
immediate resignation.42 Within a period of fifteen days the sustained protests resulted in the 
governor’s resignation, which he delivered via Facebook Live just a few minutes before the 
clock struck 12:00 a.m. on the morning of 25 July 2019—the sixty-seventh anniversary of the 
signing of the ELA.43
These protests were in great part led by a new political generation that the trap singer Bad 
Bunny has dubbed la generación del Yo no me dejo (i.e., “the nonsubmissive generation”). The 
phrase “Yo no me dejo” is a direct response to the slick slogan of #YoNoMeQuito; it rejects 
the call to endure and instead suggests that this generation will not quit or migrate, but it also 
will not allow itself to be screwed over or duped.
As activist Aliana Bigio explained in a recent podcast interview, the current generation of 
activists in Puerto Rico were born into crisis: “I don’t remember, ever since I was a kid, living 
in a period not characterized by crisis.”44 In a recently penned reflection titled “I’m a Daughter 
of the Crisis and I Have Nothing to Lose,” she writes,
We resent the country left to us by previous generations and the scarce or nonexistent oppor-
tunities for progress that we have. We work for miserable wages that are not enough to live 
on. We go to a university that is less accessible every day. We prepare to enter a violent work 
environment that does not reward the preparation we have. To become professionals, we have 
to borrow heavily and be slaves to absurd loans. The health system has failed us and keeps 
many in constant uncertainty. . . .
We are a generation that does not know the luxuries of having a good economy, we did not 
live the years of prosperity and, for this and so many other reasons, we have nothing to lose.
(Resentimos el país que nos dejaron las generaciones anteriores y las escasas o inexistentes 
oportunidades de progreso que tenemos. Trabajamos por salarios miserables que no dan para 
vivir. Vamos a una universidad que cada día es menos accesible. Nos preparamos para entrar 
en un ambiente laboral violento que no recompensa la preparación que tenemos. Para hacernos 
profesionales, tenemos que endeudarnos masivamente y ser esclavos de préstamos absurdos. 
El sistema de salud nos ha fallado y mantiene a muchos en una incertidumbre constante. . . .
41 See Yarimar Bonilla, “The Leaked Texts at the Heart of Puerto Rico’s Massive Protests,” The Nation, 22 July 2019.
42 For an analysis of the hashtag campaign, see Danilo T. Perez-Rivera, Christopher Torres-Lugo, and Alexis R. Santos 
Lozada, “Engaging for Puerto Rico: #RickyRenuncia (and #RickySeQueda) during El verano del 19 and Digital Identities,” 
SocArXiv, 13 August 2019, osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/wdk9u/.
43 For more detailed analysis of these events, see the collections “The Decolonial Geographies of Puerto Rico’s 2019 
Summer Protests: A Forum,” Society and Space, www.societyandspace.org/forums/the-decolonial-geographies-of-puerto 
-ricos-2019–summer-protests-a-forum (accessed 1 March 2020); and “Verano Boricua / #RickyRenuncia,” Puerto Rico 
Syllabus, www.puertoricosyllabus.com/verano-boricua-rickyrenunica/ (accessed 1 March 2020). For a detailed chronology, 
see Benjamin Torres Gotay, “Los quince días que tumbaron Rosselló,” El Nuevo Día, 25 July 2019.
44 “Yo no me recuerdo en ningún momento, desde chiquita, vivir en un periodo sin crisis”; Laura Rexach and Carla López 
de Azua, “¡Estamos de vuelta!—Hablamos con Aliana Bigio sobre #RickyRenuncia y #MujeresEnResistencia,” Alzando 
la voz (podcast), 1 March 2020, player.fm/series/alzando-la-voz/estamos-de-vuelta-hablamos-con-aliana-bigio-sobre 
-rickyrenuncia-y-mujeresenresistencia.
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Somos una generación que no conoce los lujos de tener una buena economía, no vivimos 
los años de prosperidad y, por esta y tantas razones más, no tenemos nada que perder.)45
It is telling that for Aliana “having nothing to lose,” and the willingness to risk it all, does 
not involve taking a leap into exile, but rather daring to stay and daring to reject the displace-
ment and dispossession that both disaster capitalism and austerity governance foment. Aliana 
concludes: “We have been warned that if we want a better future, we will have to get it ‘on the 
outside,’ but we don’t want to leave, we want to create a better future here.”46
Aliana and others of her generation want to redefine what it means to stay home and 
engage in political action for a better future. They do not want to quitarse by migrating, but 
they also don’t want to dejarse, which would mean allowing the government to sink them 
into further precarity. They argue that the political projects of previous generations—which 
centered around a search for decolonization through either statehood or independence—held 
their parents hostage by the promises of a future to come. They argue that their parents’ and 
grandparents’ fanatismo (blind faith in party politics) led them to tolerate corruption, misogyny, 
homophobia, and discrimination in anticipation of an ever-receding horizon of postcolonial 
prosperity where those issues could finally be addressed.
One of the key characteristics of the summer protests of 2019 was the diversity of partici-
pants and particularly the foregrounded presence of feminist and queer groups.47 The public 
faces of the protests were not the usual protagonists of Puerto Rican nationalism, long domi-
nated by patriarchal figures and traditional male leadership.48 Throughout the protests women 
of all ages were front and center, and feminists—particularly black feminists—were key to 
the movement, as were drag queens and other members of the cuir (queer) community who 
proudly asserted their patería combativa (or combative queerness).49 This was a noted depar-
ture from the traditional “scripts” of Puerto Rican nationalism that have long excluded black 
and queer political subjects.50
One of the most iconic images from the protests was that of openly gay pop star Ricky 
Martin waving an enormous rainbow flag alongside the traditional Puerto Rican one. Yet the 
most viral moment without a doubt was the perreo combativo that took place in front of the 
cathedral in Old San Juan right before the governor’s resignation.51 Perreo, a kind of dancehall 
or twerk, is an overtly sexualized, raced, and classed form of bodily expression. Its deploy-
ment by scantily clad queer bodies in front of the cathedral caused one of the few moments of 
45 Aliana Margarita Bigio Alcoba, “Soy hija de la crisis y no tengo nada que perder,” Todas PR, 26 July 2019, www.todaspr
.com/soy-hija-de-la-crisis-y-no-tengo-nada-que-perder/.
46 “Todxs nosotrxs hemos sido advertidos que, si queremos un mejor futuro, lo vamos a tener que conseguir ‘allá afuera,’ 
pero nosotrxs no queremos irnos, queremos crear un mejor futuro aquí adentro”; ibid.
47 See Ed Morales, “Feminist and LGBTQ Activists Are Leading the Insurrection in Puerto Rico,” The Nation, 2 August 2019.
48 See Juan G. Gelpí, Literatura y paternalismo en Puerto Rico (San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1993).
49 See Bárbara I. Abadía-Rexach, “Summer 2019: The Great Racialized Puerto Rican Family Protesting in the Street Fear-
lessly,” Society and Space, 25 February 2020.
50 See Isar P. Godreau, Scripts of Blackness: Race, Cultural Nationalism, and US Colonialism in Puerto Rico (Urbana: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 2015).
51 See Karla Claudio Betancourt, “Perreo combativo,” Vimeo, 25 July 2019, vimeo.com/350139441.
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discord among the protesters, some of whom felt it had crossed a line. But for others that line-
crossing was a necessary transgression for the production of a new postdisaster queer future.
La futura
For the current generation of activists, a postdisaster future is one that shuns the postco-
lonial project of middle-class respectability, heteronormativity, economic nationalism, and 
proper postcolonial governance. In many ways, these practices evoke what Deborah Thomas 
describes as “modern blackness”—a political project that questions the respectability politics 
of a middle-class nationalist elite.52 In many ways the postdisaster future is thus a cuir future.
Others have noted that while Puerto Rico was becoming a space of ruin, it was at the same 
time becoming a site of rising queer and trans visibility. “[Hurricane Maria] allowed people to 
explore things that they couldn’t do,” performance artist Macha Colón explains, “and now they 
realize that they can do it, and who the heck is going to tell them no?” She continues: “Being 
in that time of not having electricity and not kind of having rules and laws . . . it allowed for [the 
queer scene] to thrive because . . . it was sort of like we could do things without having to ask 
permission.”53 In other words, the absence of the state during hurricane recovery that lifted 
the veil off Puerto Rico’s colonial status and ushered in new forms of self-reliance also lifted (in 
part) the veil of constraint on queer communities.54 In the context of blackouts, scarcity, and 
social uncertainty, the logics of shame and homophobia fell more and more to the wayside.
“As the apocalypse continues, why wouldn’t people be queerer?,” asks trans feminist artist 
María José. “There’s no potential future,” she explains. “That sounds really nihilistic—but as 
professionalism, and capitalism, and the way that we know the world keeps crumbling, there’s 
going to be more space to be queer.” María José asserts that because heteronormativity is 
one of the foundations of capitalism and normalcy, once those screws come undone, it’s a 
different story: “You can do whatever the fuck you want.”55
While within queer studies authors such as Lee Edelman have argued that queerness 
is inherently antifuturist, this is only in relation to a reproductive futurity staked on optimistic 
visions of the future.56 This is quite distinct from the kind of pessimistic futurity that permeates 
disaster contexts in which there is little desire to preserve or defend what currently exists (i.e., 
a crisis-ridden present).
52 See Deborah A. Thomas, Modern Blackness: Nationalism, Globalization, and the Politics of Culture in Jamaica (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
53 Macha Colón, quoted in Justin Agrelo, “We Could Do Things without Having to Ask Permission,” Slate, 17 April 2019, slate 
.com/human-interest/2019/04/puerto-rico-queer-life-hurricane-maria-macha-colon.html.
54 See Hilda Lloréns, “Ruin Nation: In Puerto Rico, Hurricane Maria Laid Bare the Results of a Long-Term Crisis Created by 
Dispossession, Migration, and Economic Predation.” NACLA Report on the Americas 50, no. 2 (2018): 154–59; and Adriana 
Garriga-López, “Puerto Rico: The Future in Question,” Shima 13, no. 2 (2019): 174–92.
55 María José, quoted in Justin Agrelo, “We Could Do Things.”
56 See Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
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Figure 3. Image from María José’s performance of La futura. Screen shot by 
Karla Claudio Betancourt.
In the context of political, economic, and environmental failure, it would make sense that 
queer politics would become particularly salient after all, since “failure is something queers 
do and have always done exceptionally well.”57 It is thus unsurprising that queer communi-
ties have been able to seize postcolonial failure as a moment of potentiality and to channel 
negative affect (like pessimism and mourning) into an engine for worldmaking. As José Muñoz 
argues, “Queerness is essentially about the rejection of a here and now and an insistence 
on potentiality for another world.”58 The future, Muñoz asserts, “is queerness’s domain.” He 
describes queerness as “a mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the quag-
mire of the present.”59
The queer poet Raquel Salas-Rivera asserts that the reason cuir and trans bodies are 
on the frontlines of the postdisaster future is because they are the ones that have been most 
forced to confront the precarity of the present. “That capacity to create something from the 
space of nothing, positioned us to best understand the devastation of disaster and apoca-
lypse,” he explained. “Even if not all Boricuas are cuir, precarity has united us and the queer 
community has taken the lead because they’re the ones that have been living the longest with 
precarity—that devastating precarity, the one that resembles death so much, that sometimes 
it is death.”60
In La futura, a performance carried out during the 2019 Puerto Rican Summer, María José 
evoked her own vision of the futura cuir (a queered version of the future), proclaiming that the 
future is already here (see fig. 3):
57 Judith [Jack] Halbertsam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
58 José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (New York: New York University Press, 2019), 
xiii.
59 Ibid., 1.
60 “Esa capacidad para crear algo dentro y desde la nada, nos posicionó mejor para entender el momento devastador y 
apocalíptico del desastre. Y aunque no todxs los boricuas son cuir, la precariedad nos pone juntxs y las personas cuir tiran 
alante porque llevan más tiempo conviviendo con esa precariedad. La devastadora. La que se parece tanto a la muerte 
que a veces es muerte”; Raquel Salas-Rivera, personal communication with the author, 1 March 2020.
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/small-axe/article-pdf/24/2 (62)/147/815222/0240147.pdf
by UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, rjobson1990@gmail.com
on 05 August 2020
162 [ Yarimar Bonilla ] Postdisaster Futures
La futura has arrived.










And it’s justa [just/fair].
And if you’re not ready for that future,
you can either lock yourself in your room
and drown in your own poison
or you can join our movement
of love and justice.
For todes [a nonbinary “all”].61
María José’s vision of la futura—along with the other visions of the future asserted by 
activists during the summer 2019 movement—does not hinge on modernist visions of prog-
ress, settler notions of environmental dominance, or nationalist raced and gendered scripts 
of proper citizen subjects. Although it offers a kind of hope, it is one that recognizes that, as 
Zambrana argues, “hope equals work.”62 Unlike the cruel optimisms that blind us to the threats 
of the present, this kind of hopeful pessimism forces us to recognize the hard tasks that must 
be taken on in order to transform the here and now in order to hopefully make our world anew.
61 María José, “La futura,” filmed by Karla Claudio Betancourt, Vimeo, 25 July 2019, vimeo.com/350183727.
62 Zambrana, Colonial Debts, 15.
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